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CAN CONDOMS BE COMPELLING?   
EXAMINING THE STATE INTEREST IN 
CONFISCATING CONDOMS FROM SUSPECTED 
SEX WORKERS 
Meghan Newcomer* 
 
Confiscating condoms from suspected sex workers leaves them at risk for 
HIV/AIDS, other sexually transmitted diseases, and unwanted pregnancy.  
Yet, police officers in New York, Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles collect 
condoms from sex workers to use against them as evidence of prostitution.  
Sometimes, the condoms are taken solely for the purpose of harassment.  
These actions put sex workers at risk of contracting sexually transmitted 
diseases because they may continue to engage in sex work without using 
protection. 
In the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the U.S. Supreme Court 
established a fundamental privacy right in the use and access of 
contraceptive devices.  While this right has been examined in the context of 
married couples and individuals, it has not been applied to the confiscation 
of condoms, a contraceptive device, by police officers.  This Note shows 
that by taking condoms from suspected sex workers, police officers and 
departments are actually violating sex workers’ constitutional right to 
privacy, and, therefore, the practice must be abandoned. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“The police have told me . . . don’t carry more than three condoms on 
you because we can arrest you.”1  This statement was made to Human 
Rights Watch by Lola L., a sex worker in Los Angeles.  Lola also conducts 
street outreach work and expressed concern about the condoms-as-evidence 
policy.  In New York City, Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, police 
officers confiscate condoms to use as evidence of prostitution against 
suspected sex workers.2  Police officers are entitled to stop people they 
reasonably believe are engaged in criminal activity,3 at which time they are 
permitted to conduct a limited search of the suspect when they believe their 
 
 1. MEGAN MCLEMORE, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SEX WORKERS AT RISK:  CONDOMS AS 
EVIDENCE OF PROSTITUTION IN FOUR U.S. CITIES 49 (2012). 
 2. See id. at 1. 
 3. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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safety is at risk.4  However, police officers are not following these 
requirements when confiscating condoms.5  These officers not only take 
condoms for the purpose of evidence, but sometimes simply to throw 
away.6  Human rights organizations have criticized this policy as 
detrimental to the health of sex workers and likely to increase the spread of 
HIV/AIDS in cities that have previously experienced AIDS epidemics.7  In 
fact, in each of the three cities discussed above, “millions of condoms are 
distributed by the public health department each year as part of highly 
visible HIV prevention campaigns.”8  Despite these pressing health needs, 
in the United States, 52 percent of surveyed sex workers have chosen not to 
carry condoms because they fear confrontation with police officers for 
possessing them, and consequently these workers continue to engage in 
unsafe sex.9 
The U.S. Supreme Court has long upheld a right to privacy that includes 
the right to access and use contraceptives.10  In Carey v. Population 
Services International, the Court held that regulations imposing burdens on 
the right to contraception are only valid when they are necessary to achieve 
a compelling state interest.11  Any claimed state interest must be narrowly 
tailored so as to infringe on the smallest possible portion of any 
fundamental right.12  While the Court has struck down regulations 
interfering with contraceptive rights in a variety of contexts, it has not 
examined police officers’ widespread confiscation of alleged sex workers’ 
condoms.13 
This Note argues that confiscating alleged sex workers’ condoms violates 
their constitutional right to privacy because prosecuting prostitution is not a 
sufficiently compelling state interest to permit police officers to interfere 
with the right to contraceptives.  Part I of this Note discusses fundamental 
rights protected under the Supreme Court’s substantive due process 
doctrine, then details the experience of sex workers in New York, 
Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, examining the frequency and purpose 
behind the taking and use of condoms as evidence by police officers.  Part 
 
 4. Id. at 24. 
 5. McLemore, supra note 1, at 1. 
 6. See id. at 39 (“[T]he cops harassed me and told me to throw my condoms in the 
garbage.”). 
 7. Id. at 34; see also ACACIA SHIELDS, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS, CRIMINALIZING 
CONDOMS:  HOW POLICING PRACTICES PUT SEX WORKERS AND HIV SERVICES AT RISK IN 
KENYA, NAMIBIA, RUSSIA, SOUTH AFRICA, THE UNITED STATES, AND ZIMBABWE (2012). 
 8. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 10. 
 9. See SHIELDS, supra note 7, at 4; see also Garima Malhotra, Good Intentions, Bad 
Consequences:  How Congress’s Efforts To Eradicate HIV/AIDS Stifle the Speech of 
Humanitarian Organizations, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 839, 862 (2012) (discussing the risks 
most often associated with sex work, including police harassment, violence, exposure to 
sexually transmitted diseases, and unwanted pregnancies). 
 10. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding that citizens are 
entitled to make decisions about contraception without unjustified government interference). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 686. 
 13. See id. at 678; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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II explains the Court’s contraceptives jurisprudence and then examines the 
state interests in confiscating condoms for evidence while enforcing 
antiprostitution laws.  Part III argues that this police practice violates the 
protections laid out in the Supreme Court’s contraception cases. 
I.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND CRIMINAL LAW FRAMEWORK FOR 
ANALYZING THE CONFISCATION OF CONDOMS AS EVIDENCE FROM 
SUSPECTED SEX WORKERS 
This Part describes the constitutional and criminal procedure framework 
for evaluating the constitutionality of police practices, before discussing the 
practice of confiscating condoms from suspected sex workers.  Part I.A 
describes the constitutional law framework for evaluating infringements of 
rights that the Supreme Court has deemed fundamental.  Part I.B describes 
criminal procedure laws that relate to stopping and searching people 
suspected of engaging in criminal activity.  Part I.C discusses the 
international human rights law framework to which the United States is 
subject in relation to preventing the spread of sexually transmitted diseases.  
Part I.D then discusses the experience of sex workers in three cities, New 
York City, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C., and their interactions with 
police officers who are engaged in confiscating condoms. 
A.  Constitutional Law Framework 
The Constitution and the Bill of Rights protect fundamental rights.  This 
section discusses the Supreme Court’s history of upholding those 
protections and the extension of those protections to rights not specifically 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 
1.  Fundamental Rights Analysis Under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment14 provides that no 
state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”15  From this amendment, the Supreme Court has created a 
detailed jurisprudence of due process.16  There are two types of due 
process:  procedural due process and substantive due process.17  Procedural 
due process concerns whether the government has sufficiently provided the 
procedural protections guaranteed by the Constitution before taking away 
life, liberty or property.18  Substantive due process issues arise when there 
is a question regarding whether the government has a sufficient goal or 
purpose to justify an action that infringes on a person’s right to life, liberty, 
 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Lee Goldman, The Constitutional Right to Privacy, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 601, 
604 (2006). 
 17. Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501 
(1999). 
 18. Id. 
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or property.19  Substantive due process protects both rights explicitly stated 
in the Bill of Rights and rights that the Supreme Court has decreed are 
“deeply rooted in our history and traditions, or . . . fundamental to our 
concept of constitutionally ordered liberty,”20 including the right to 
privacy.21  Under the privacy heading, the Supreme Court has held that due 
process protects the right to marry,22 to have children,23 to direct the 
education and upbringing of one’s children,24 to enjoy marital privacy,25 to 
use contraception,26 to obtain an abortion,27 and to maintain bodily 
integrity.28  Because these rights are fundamental, the Supreme Court 
accords them the highest protection, the strict scrutiny test, discussed 
below.29 
2.  Three Levels of Scrutiny for Evaluating Fundamental Rights 
The Supreme Court has defined three levels of scrutiny for determining 
whether a government action is unconstitutional:  (1) the rational basis test, 
(2) intermediate scrutiny, and (3) strict scrutiny.30  These different levels of 
scrutiny place varying burdens of proof on the government:  a heavy burden 
for infringing on a fundamental right, but a lower burden in areas where the 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997). 
 21. See Chemerinksy, supra note 17, at 1501; see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 549 
(1961) (“[T]he concept of ‘privacy’ embodied in the Fourth Amendment is part of the 
‘ordered liberty’ assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy has been 
declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
[Amendment] . . . .”). 
 22. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a Virginia state miscegenation 
statute that forbade interracial marriages violates due process and equal protection 
guarantees). 
 23. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that a criminal law statute 
which allowed the sterilization of convicts violated one of the “basic civil rights of man” and 
was therefore unconstitutional). 
 24. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (declaring unconstitutional a state 
law that banned parochial schools as violating a parent’s right to control the upbringing of 
their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (ruling unconstitutional a statute 
that forbade the teaching of a foreign language in schools as violating parental rights to 
direct the upbringing of their children, a protected right under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 25. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a state law 
that interfered with married couples’ right to use contraception). 
 26. Id.; see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (declaring unconstitutional a 
state law that forbade single individuals from obtaining contraception while permitting 
married couples to do so as violating the equal protection doctrine). 
 27. Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming the right 
to abortion as a fundamental right protected by the constitution); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) (establishing the right to obtain an abortion before fetal viability as a fundamental 
right). 
 28. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (finding that forcing ingestion of a 
substance to produce vomiting into a person suspected of swallowing drugs violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 29. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); see also infra Part I.A.3–4. 
 30. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 6.5, at 
552–54 (4th ed. 2011). 
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Court generally defers to the legislature.31  The rational basis test is the 
least stringent standard of review and requires laws to be “rationally related 
to a legitimate government purpose” to be upheld.32  Because this test only 
requires that a law be rationally related to a conceivable government 
purpose, most governmental actions reviewed under this standard are 
upheld.33 
Under intermediate scrutiny, a law is upheld if it “substantially relate[s] 
to a legitimate government purpose.”34  Courts sometimes refer to this 
standard as heightened scrutiny because of the stronger correlation required 
between the state’s law and purpose.35  Laws that discriminate by gender, 
for example, are reviewed under this framework.36 
The most demanding type of scrutiny is strict scrutiny, which requires 
that a law be “necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose” to be 
upheld.37  This also means that “the State’s asserted purpose must be 
specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.”38  Courts use 
this highest level of scrutiny when considering laws based on racial 
classifications39 and laws that infringe on rights deemed fundamental by the 
Supreme Court, including the right to access and use contraception.40 
3.  Requirements for Government Infringement of a Fundamental Right 
There are four questions that are relevant to a fundamental rights 
analysis:  Is there a fundamental right at issue?41  Has that right been 
infringed by state action?42  Is the government action justified by a 
compelling interest?43  And are the means of effectuating the law 
 
 31. Id. § 6.5, at 551; see also Eric Heinze, The Logic of Standards of Review in 
Constitutional Cases:  A Deontic Analysis, 28 VT. L. REV. 121, 123 (2004). 
 32. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, § 6.5, at 552 (emphasis omitted). 
 33. Id. § 6.5, at 553; see, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (holding 
that under rational basis review, the Supreme Court will not invalidate laws Congress enacts 
when they are supported by a conceivable government purpose). 
 34. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, § 6.5, at 553 (emphasis omitted). 
 35. See Peter S. Smith, The Demise of Three-Tier Review:  Has the United States 
Supreme Court Adopted a “Sliding Scale” Approach Toward Equal Protection 
Jurisprudence?, 23 J. CONTEMP. L. 475, 478 (1997). 
 36. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190 (1976). 
 37. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, § 6.5, at 554 (emphasis omitted). 
 38. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986). 
 39. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (holding that a prison policy of 
segregating prisoners based on race must meet strict scrutiny). 
 40. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, § 6.5, at 554; see also Suzanne Davis & Paul 
Lansing, When Two Fundamental Rights Collide at the Pharmacy:  The Struggle To Balance 
the Consumer’s Right To Access Contraception and the Pharmacist’s Right of Conscience, 
12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 67, 86 (2009) (“[U]sing contraception is considered a 
fundamental right under right of privacy law and consequently it should be free from 
governmental interference.”); Gwendolyn Prothro, Ru 486 Examined:  Impact of a New 
Technology on an Old Controversy, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 715, 721 (1997). 
 41. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, § 10.1.2, at 814. 
 42. Id. at 816. 
 43. Id. at 817. 
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sufficiently tailored to the goal?44  Under the strict scrutiny analysis used 
for fundamental rights, the government bears the burden of proving that the 
infringement of the constitutional right is necessary to achieve a compelling 
government purpose and that the law is narrowly tailored to involve the 
smallest infringement of the right.45 
a.  The Law Serves a Compelling State Interest 
The government must prove that an infringement of a fundamental right 
is necessary for a law to accomplish a compelling government purpose, or 
the law will be struck down.46  The Supreme Court has not articulated the 
criteria necessary for establishing when an infringement serves a 
compelling government purpose, but “the government has the burden of 
persuading the Court that a truly vital interest is served by the law in 
question.”47 
While a compelling government purpose is a high bar to meet, the 
Supreme Court found that the government had a compelling interest in 
issues of wartime necessity in Korematsu v. United States.48  In Korematsu, 
the Court upheld the internment of Japanese American citizens based solely 
on their race as the means necessary to protect national security.49  Citing 
the hardships involved in war for all citizens, the Court found that an 
infringement of liberty on the basis of national origin was constitutional 
because of the compelling government interest in keeping America safe.50  
Referencing modern warfare abilities, the Court stated that “the power to 
protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger.”51  This 
government interest in protecting American citizens during wartime was a 
sufficiently compelling state interest to meet the strict scrutiny standard.52  
In Zablocki v. Redhail53 the Court also found a compelling state interest in 
the need to adequately care for children.  A Wisconsin law prohibited 
marriage for parents with a minor child not in their custody unless the 
parent could prove that he or she had made all child support payments.  The 
Court found that the ability to ensure that children are properly cared for 
was a “legitimate and substantial interest[],”54 however the state statute was 
overly broad and therefore did not satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement 
of strict scrutiny.55 
 
 44. Id. at 817–18. 
 45. Id. § 6.5, at 554. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. § 10.1.2, at 817. 
 48. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 49. See id. at 223–24. 
 50. See id. at 219–20.  National origin classifications, like race, are subject to strict 
scrutiny. 
 51. Id. at 220. 
 52. Id. 
 53. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 54. Id. at 388. 
 55. Id. at 389. 
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b.  The Law Is Narrowly Tailored to the State Interest 
To pass a strict scrutiny standard, the government must also be able to 
prove that the law, as enacted, is the “least restrictive” or “least 
discriminatory” alternative available.56  This narrow tailoring requirement 
means that legislation cannot be under- or overinclusive, and that “the fit 
between the government’s action and its asserted purpose [must] be ‘as 
perfect as practicable.’”57  In analyzing a state’s interest, any infringing 
regulation must be precisely tailored to avoid infringing on a fundamental 
right.58  If the law could be enacted in a way that would result in less 
interference with a fundamental right, then the law will not survive the 
narrow tailoring analysis.59  Moreover, the requirement against 
overinclusive regulations suggests that even if there is not a less intrusive 
alternative, the narrow tailoring requirement may still not be satisfied.60  
Because of this very high standard, most laws analyzed under strict scrutiny 
are struck down.61 
B.  Criminal Procedure Framework 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, requiring both federal and state actors to obtain a warrant before 
depriving a person of liberty or property.62  The Supreme Court has created 
exceptions to the warrant requirement, allowing police officers to conduct 
searches or seizures without a warrant when there is a sufficient level of 
suspicion that criminal activity is occurring.63  Police officers conduct 
 
 56. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, § 6.5, at 554; see also, e.g., Simon & Schuster, 
Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 121–23 (1991) (stating that 
when a substantial burden on a right subject to strict scrutiny does not serve the 
government’s stated purpose, the narrow tailoring requirement will not be met). 
 57. Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict 
Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 360 (2006). 
 58. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (stating that “[p]recision of regulation” 
is the “touchstone” of narrow tailoring). 
 59. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1326 
(2007). 
 60. Id. at 1328 (“Whereas the least restrictive alternative formulation invites the 
conclusion that a regulation that is necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest 
will therefore satisfy strict scrutiny as long as no narrower regulation would suffice, the 
prohibition against overinclusiveness suggests that a statute might be condemned for lack of 
narrow tailoring even if no less restrictive alternative existed.”). 
 61. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, § 6.5, at 554; Gerald Gunther, Foreword:  In 
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:  A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 
86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (calling strict scrutiny “strict in theory and fatal in fact”). 
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); see 
also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating the protections guaranteed in the 
Fourth Amendment against the states). 
 63. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishing the reasonable suspicion 
standard for limited stops). 
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warrantless searches of suspected sex workers based on the suspicion that 
they are engaging in sex work in violation of state criminal laws.64 
1.  Probable Cause Is Necessary To Initiate an Arrest 
Because an arrest is an invasive seizure, the level of suspicion necessary 
to arrest a person is the high standard of probable cause.65  Probable cause 
exists for an arrest when a reasonable police officer believes, in light of all 
the facts available, that a man of reasonable caution could believe that a 
crime was being or had been committed.66  Once a police officer has placed 
a person under arrest, the officer may conduct a limited search of that 
person incident to the arrest for two purposes:  to determine if the person 
has any weapons that pose a danger to the officer, and to collect evidence to 
prevent its destruction.67  The Supreme Court’s holding in Chimel v. 
California allows police officers to collect evidence “on the arrestee’s 
person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.”68  In United 
States v. Robinson,69 the Court extended this ability to search incident to an 
arrest, giving police officers the ability to search any container on the 
person found during a lawful arrest, even without suspicion that the 
container holds a dangerous item posing a risk to officer safety.70  This 
allows officers to search any container on a person for evidence of a crime 
incident to a lawful arrest.71 
2.  Terry Stops Can Be Conducted on the Basis of Reasonable Suspicion 
In Terry v. Ohio,72 the Supreme Court held that police officers may 
conduct a limited stop of a person based on reasonable suspicion that 
criminal activity is afoot.73  The officer may also conduct a limited frisk of 
the stopped person if there is reasonable suspicion that the person is 
carrying a weapon that could harm the officer.74  In permitting warrantless 
searches based on low levels of suspicion, the Court emphasized the 
importance of the state interest in protecting police officers and stopping 
crime, balancing that interest against the very limited intrusion that occurs 
 
 64. See infra notes 77–82 and accompanying text. 
 65. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963). 
 66. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (holding that probable cause 
exists when “the facts and circumstances within [an officer’s] knowledge and of which [the 
officer] had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient in themselves to warrant a 
man of reasonable caution in the belief that” a crime was being committed). 
 67. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
 68. Id. at 763; see also Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule:  Police 
Authority To Search Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 391 (2001). 
 69. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 70. See id.; see also James J. Tomkovicz, Divining and Designing the Future of the 
Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine:  Avoiding Instability, Irrationality, and Infidelity, 2007 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1431. 
 71. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
 72. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 73. Id. at 30. 
 74. Id. at 24. 
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with a short stop and frisk.75  Because the intrusion is so minimal, the Court 
found the lower standard of reasonable suspicion, instead of probable cause, 
sufficient to conduct what is now called a “Terry stop.”76 
C.  The Police Practice of Taking Condoms from Suspected Sex Workers 
This section discusses the research conducted by human rights 
organizations laying out the experience of sex workers and outreach 
workers in New York City, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C.  It 
describes their interactions with police officers in relation to the condoms-
as-evidence policies practiced in each city.  It also discusses policies and 
pending legislation enacted as a result of growing criticisms of condoms-as-
evidence practices. 
1.  The Practice of Taking Condoms As Evidence in New York City 
This section discusses the law and policies that permit police officers in 
New York City to take condoms from suspected sex workers. 
a.  New York Laws Governing Prostitution and 
Prostitution-Related Offenses 
New York State defines prostitution as occurring when a person 
“engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct with another 
person in return for a fee.”77  New York law also makes it a crime to loiter 
for the purpose of prostitution, defined by the law as 
[a]ny person who remains or wanders about in a public place and 
repeatedly beckons to, or repeatedly stops, or repeatedly attempts to stop, 
or repeatedly attempts to engage passers-by in conversation, or repeatedly 
stops or attempts to stop motor vehicles, or repeatedly interferes with the 
free passage of other persons, for the purpose of prostitution.78 
It is also a criminal act to promote prostitution,79 patronize prostitution,80 or 
engage in sex trafficking81 in New York.  Prostitution is a misdemeanor 
offense, while loitering for the purpose of prostitution is a violation or a 
possible misdemeanor.82  For police officers to stop someone and search 
them for an attempted prostitution crime, there must be sufficient evidence 
 
 75. Id.; see also Mark A. Godsey, When Terry Met Miranda:  Two Constitutional 
Doctrines Collide, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 746 (1994) (discussing the limited intrusion 
involved in a Terry stop). 
 76. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30–31. 
 77. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.00 (McKinney 2012). 
 78. Id. § 240.37. 
 79. Id. §§ 230.15–.32. 
 80. Id. §§ 230.02–.10. 
 81. Id. § 230.34. 
 82. See id. §§ 230.00–240.37.  If loitering for prostitution is characterized as a violation, 
the only penalty is a fine, however if it is punished as a misdemeanor, a person can face jail 
time, a fine, or both. Id. § 240.37. 
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that a reasonable police officer could believe that the crime of prostitution 
was occurring or was likely to occur.83 
b.  Firsthand Accounts from Sex Workers in New York City 
In compiling their data on the use of condoms as evidence of prostitution, 
Human Rights Watch interviewed a group of sex workers to discuss their 
interactions with police and the process frequently undertaken when police 
officers suspect a person of being engaged in sex work.84  Sex workers 
reported that not only were they stopped and searched by police officers, 
because of the low threshold necessary for initiating a stop and search,85 
police officers frequently took their condoms and commented on the 
number of contraceptives they had on their person.86  One sex worker from 
Queens, New York, reported that, after being stopped by police officers and 
asked to empty her purse, she left condoms in the bottom of her purse.87  
When the police noticed the condoms, they told her that next time they 
caught her they would arrest her for carrying condoms, because condoms 
served as evidence that she was engaged in prostitution.88  Another person 
engaged in sex work in Brooklyn, New York, stated that if police officers 
find a person is carrying more than three or four condoms “they will take 
them, they will be disrespectful.”89  Still another sex worker stated that 
while working in Queens, two cops arrested her for carrying condoms.90  
She stated, “The charge was that I had more than one condom in my bag.  
They locked me up for two days for solicitation and prostitution . . . they 
said I had condoms, it was on the report.”91 
In interviews conducted by the Urban Justice Center for a report on 
street-based prostitution in New York City, sex workers similarly reported 
that police officers interfered with their condoms.92  The Village Voice, a 
New York City periodical, was also told stories about police officers taking 
condoms from people they suspected of engaging in sex work.93  Both the 
Urban Justice Center report and the interviews conducted by the Village 
Voice corroborate the information provided to Human Rights Watch.94 
In 2010, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 
conducted a survey with local organizations to assess whether police 
 
 83. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 84. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 17. 
 85. See supra Part I.D.1.a. 
 86. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 18. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 20. 
 91. Id. (alteration in original). 
 92. JUHU THUKRAL & MELISSA DITMORE, URBAN JUSTICE CENTER, SEX WORKERS 
PROJECTS, REVOLVING DOOR:  AN ANALYSIS OF STREET-BASED PROSTITUTION IN NEW YORK 
CITY 79 (2003). 
 93. Emily Gogolak, New York’s Condom Bait-and-Switch, VILLAGE VOICE (Mar. 6, 
2013), http://www.villagevoice.com/2013-03-06/news/nyc-s-condom-insanity/full/. 
 94. See supra notes 84–93 and accompanying text. 
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officers were confiscating condoms, and what role that played in sex 
workers’ decisions to carry them.95  The Department surveyed sixty-three 
individuals involved in sex work.96  Of those people surveyed, 57 percent 
had had condoms taken away from them by a police officer.97  The survey 
also showed that 29 percent of those questioned had engaged in sex work at 
least once without carrying condoms for fear of confrontation with police 
officers.98  Despite these findings, the Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene, which originally stated that it supported pending legislation in the 
New York State Senate to end the condoms-as-evidence policy, changed its 
position.99  The Department now contends that the policy “has not resulted 
in sex workers consistently failing to carry condoms because of fear of 
arrest” and that they “have seen no evidence that the current law 
undermines the public health aims of condom distribution.”100 
c.  New York Pending Legislation on Condoms As Evidence 
Pending legislation in the New York State Senate proposes to outlaw the 
police practice of taking condoms as evidence of prostitution.101  The bill 
was passed by the New York State Assembly in June 2013, and is now 
awaiting passage in the state senate and signature by the governor.102  This 
bill would outlaw the use of condoms as evidence in any trial, hearing, or 
proceeding concerning prostitution, and has been reproposed each term, but 
has continually died in committee.103 
2.  The Practice of Taking Condoms As Evidence in Los Angeles 
This section discusses California laws governing the policing of 
prostitution before discussing the police policy in Los Angeles of taking 
condoms as evidence from suspected sex workers. 
   
 
 95. PAUL KOBRAK, A REPORT TO THE NEW YORK CITY COMMISSIONER OF HEALTH, NEW 
YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE 2 (2010). 
 96. Id. at 3. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 6. 
 99. Jim Dwyer, Giving Away, and Then Seizing, Condoms, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2012, 
at A18. 
 100. Id. 
 101. S. 2013-S1379, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013), available at http://open.nysenate.gov/
legislation/bill/S1379-2013. 
 102. Assemb. 2013-A2736, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013), available at http://open.
nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/A2736-2013; see also New York:  Assembly Passes Condom 
Law, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 25, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/25/new-york-
assembly-passes-condom-law. 
 103. Id. 
1066 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
a.  California Laws Governing Prostitution and 
Prostitution-Related Offenses 
California law defines the act of prostitution as: 
A person agrees to engage in an act of prostitution when, with specific 
intent to so engage, he or she manifests an acceptance of an offer or 
solicitation to so engage, regardless of whether the offer or solicitation 
was made by a person who also possessed the specific intent to engage in 
prostitution.  No agreement to engage in an act of prostitution shall 
constitute a violation of this subdivision unless some act, in addition to 
the agreement, is done within this state in furtherance of the commission 
of an act of prostitution by the person agreeing to engage in that act.104 
California penal law also prohibits prevailing upon a person to visit a place 
of prostitution,105 and purchasing a person for purposes of prostitution.106 
b.  Firsthand Accounts from Sex Workers in Los Angeles 
Los Angeles has a similar policy to New York that allows police officers 
to confiscate condoms from suspected sex workers, and “according to sex 
workers in Los Angeles, condoms are commonly used as one of the bases 
for arrest for prostitution.”107  One sex worker interviewed by Human 
Rights Watch stated that police officers took six condoms out of her bag 
and then arrested her, and that the condoms were part of the evidence that 
was used to put her in jail.108  Another sex worker reported that “condoms 
in purse” was listed on her arrest report, and that she no longer carries 
condoms in her purse for fear of being arrested again.109 
Sex workers in Los Angeles share a belief that carrying more than three 
condoms is illegal.110  This belief is propagated by police officers who tell 
sex workers that carrying more than three condoms will give the officers the 
right to arrest them for prostitution.111  Human Rights Watch reports that 
sex workers told outreach workers involved in HIV/AIDS prevention that 
police tell them “that if they have more than two condoms in their purse, 
they can be charged with an act of prostitution.”112  While police officers 
have been known to espouse this belief, there is no rule in Los Angeles that 
makes it illegal to carry more than three condoms.113 
 
 104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 2010). 
 105. Id. § 318. 
 106. Id. § 266(e). 
 107. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 47. 
 108. Id. at 48 (citing Interview by Human Rights Watch with Alessa N., in L.A., Cal. 
(Mar. 13, 2012)). 
 109. Id. at 52 (citing Interview by Human Rights Watch with Serena L., in L.A., Cal. 
(Mar. 14, 2012)). 
 110. Id. at 48. 
 111. Id. at 49.  As one sex worker stated, “The police have told me, when you’re in a high 
risk area, don’t carry more than three condoms on you because we can arrest you.” Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. at 48. 
2013] CAN CONDOMS BE COMPELLING? 1067 
c.  Harassment of Outreach Workers Distributing Condoms 
Outreach workers in Los Angeles also experience harassment at the 
hands of the police when handing out condoms to sex workers.114  While 
Los Angeles is concerned with stopping the spread of HIV/AIDS, even 
enacting syringe exchange programs for drug users to prevent the spread of 
the disease,115 police officers frequently stop and question outreach workers 
when they are giving condoms to sex workers.116  One service provider 
working on behalf of sex workers reported “that the outreach workers on 
her staff had been stopped and questioned several times by the police for 
distributing condoms.”117 
d.  Current Bill in the California State Legislature 
A bill passed by the California State Assembly in May 2013 would 
heighten the requirements for introducing condoms as evidence in the 
prosecution of sex workers.118  The bill originally sought to ban the use of 
condoms as evidence outright, but it was amended in assembly to achieve 
the necessary two-thirds majority vote for passage.119  The bill requires 
prosecutors who intend to introduce condoms into evidence to alert the 
court and the defendant of the relevancy of the possession of condoms 
before being allowed to submit them as evidence of prostitution.120 
3.  The System of Taking Condoms As Evidence As 
Carried Out in Washington, D.C. 
This section addresses the laws and policies that permit police officers in 
Washington, D.C. to confiscate condoms from people they suspect of 
engaging in sex work. 
a.  Washington, D.C. Laws Governing Prostitution and 
Prostitution-Related Offenses 
In Washington, D.C. it is a crime to engage in prostitution, which 
criminal law statutes define as engaging in a “sexual act or contact with 
another person in return for giving or receiving a fee.”121  The law also 
prohibits soliciting prostitution, defined as to “invite, entice, offer, 
persuade, or agree to engage in prostitution or address for the purpose of 
inviting, enticing, offering, persuading, or agreeing to engage in 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Syringe Exchange Programs, CITY OF L.A. AIDS COORDINATOR’S OFFICE, 
http://disability.lacity.org/aids/syringe_exchange.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013). 
 116. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 48. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Assemb. 2013-AB336, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013), available at http://legiscan.com/
CA/bill/AB336/2013. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. D.C. CODE § 22-2701.01 (2001). 
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prostitution.”122  The District of Columbia also makes it illegal to compel a 
person to engage in prostitution,123 receive money for arranging 
prostitution,124 or to operate a house of prostitution.125 
In 2005, the District of Columbia enacted a measure entitled the 
Omnibus Public Safety Act, which provided for certain areas to be 
designated as Prostitution Free Zones (PFZ) by the police department.126  
Police officers can designate an area as a PFZ for up to 480 hours based on 
a high incidence of arrest for prostitution in the recent past, or because of 
verifiable evidence that there is a high incidence of prostitution occurring in 
the area.127  The law allows officers to arrest people for congregating for 
the purpose of prostitution and states that the totality of the circumstances 
will be used to decide if a prostitution-related offense is occurring.128  Once 
an area has been designated a PFZ, arrests in that area can be based on 
circumstantial evidence, similar to what is allowed under New York’s 
loitering for prostitution laws.129 
b.  Firsthand Accounts from Sex Workers in Washington, D.C. 
In Washington, D.C., sex workers were most frequently targeted for 
carrying condoms during brief stops to enforce antiprostitution laws.130  
Sex workers in D.C. reported that police officers frequently questioned 
them about why they were carrying so many condoms and often told 
suspected sex workers to “throw [their] condoms in the garbage.”131  One 
woman reported that after being stopped by a police officer, “[t]he cop told 
me I could have three condoms and threw the others out, I had ten 
altogether.  Also, an open condom is a charge.  I’ve been locked up for it, 
the cops told me they were locking me up for an open condom.”132 
Like their counterparts in Los Angeles,133 sex workers in Washington, 
D.C. also spoke of a “three condom rule,” which had been communicated to 
them either through fellow sex workers or through police officers in 
exchanges such as the one detailed above.134  Outreach workers who were 
interviewed by Human Rights Watch also commented on the apparent 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. § 22-2705. 
 124. Id. § 22-2707. 
 125. Id. § 22-2712. 
 126. Id. § 22-2731. 
 127. Id. § 22-2731(b)(1). 
 128. Id. § 22-2731(d)(2); see also Dean Spade, The Only Way To End Racialized Gender 
Violence in Prisons Is To End Prisons:  A Response to Russell Robinson’s “Masculinity As 
Prison,” 3 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 184, 193 (2012) (discussing how prostitution free zones 
are used to enhance the policing of sex work). 
 129. D.C. CODE § 22-2731; see also supra Part I.D.1.a. 
 130. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 37. 
 131. Id. at 39; see also ALLIANCE FOR A SAFE & DIVERSE D.C., MOVE ALONG:  POLICING 
SEX WORK IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 33 (2008), available at http://dctranscoalition.files.
wordpress.com/2010/05/movealongreport.pdf. 
 132. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 40. 
 133. See supra Parts I.D.2, II.B.2. 
 134. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 40. 
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belief that having more than a few condoms could result in arrest or police 
harassment, even though Washington, D.C. does not have a law or statute 
that says police officers should confiscate condoms when a suspected sex 
worker is carrying more than three.135 
c.  Harassment of Outreach Workers Distributing Condoms 
Outreach workers themselves report being harassed by police officers for 
distributing condoms to sex workers.136  In one instance, outreach workers 
delivered condoms to a club known for prostitution.137  When they left the 
club, police officers jumped out of nearby vans and demanded 
identification.138  This type of interaction with police officers contributes to 
the difficulty of distributing condoms to prostitutes.139 
d.  Recent Action by the Metro Police Department 
The Washington, D.C. Metro Police Department (MPD) recently released 
know-your-rights cards that clarified department policy on condoms.140  
The cards state that having three condoms is not an offense, and that the 
MPD supports the distribution of condoms for the prevention of sexually 
transmitted diseases.141  The MPD also clarified that police may not 
conduct a stop or a search based on the fact that a person has condoms.142 
4.  San Francisco’s Previous Policy on Confiscating Condoms 
In 1994, San Francisco barred the use of condoms as evidence in 
prostitution for a trial period, before permanently ceasing the confiscation 
of condoms in 1995.143  Following extensive research by the San Francisco 
Task Force on Prostitution, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors issued a 
nonbinding resolution recommending that the San Francisco Police 
Department and the district attorney cease confiscating condoms from 
suspected sex workers or using them in the prosecution of prostitution 
cases.144  The resolution specifically pointed to the fact that taking condoms 
from suspected sex workers discouraged them from using protection, which 
increased the risk of HIV/AIDS in direct opposition to the city’s policy on 
HIV prevention.145  The resolution also emphasized that the public health 
 
 135. Id. at 39 (“Clients take fewer condoms than they need because they fear the 
police.”). 
 136. See ALLIANCE FOR A SAFE & DIVERSE D.C., supra note 131, at 20. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 57. 
 140. Press Release, AIDS United, Advocacy Coalition Supports MPD Clarification of 
Condom Policy (Mar. 11, 2013) (on file with Fordham Law Review). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. THE S.F. TASK FORCE ON PROSTITUTION, FINAL REPORT 23 (1996). 
 144. Id. at 11. 
 145. Id. at 10 (“Completely contrary to the policy of improving public health, the San 
Francisco Police Department had a policy of confiscating condoms from people arrested for 
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value of condoms for HIV prevention greatly outweighed the value to law 
enforcement in enforcing prostitution laws.146 
In response to the resolution, the District Attorney for San Francisco, 
Arlo Smith, agreed to suspend the condoms-as-evidence policy for a trial 
period.147  Smith pointed out to the Director of Public Health that condoms 
were useful evidence in proving an act in furtherance of prostitution.148  In 
1995, Smith’s office announced that they would permanently cease using 
condoms as evidence of prostitution, without further explanation.149  While 
police officers no longer take condoms, they do still photograph condoms to 
use as evidence against suspected sex workers.150  This policy, while less 
invasive than taking condoms outright, still inhibits sex workers’ ability to 
carry condoms for fear that police officers will use the condoms against 
them.151 
II.  IS THE STATE INTEREST IN POLICING PROSTITUTION SUFFICIENTLY 
COMPELLING TO JUSTIFY THE INFRINGEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTIONS AFFORDED TO CONTRACEPTION? 
While state officials have an interest in preventing prostitution in 
accordance with state laws, the Supreme Court has found a constitutional 
right to access and use contraception.  Because taking condoms from sex 
workers hinders their ability to access and use contraception, the police 
policies may conflict with the constitutional right to contraception.  If the 
practice does conflict with the protections afforded to contraceptives under 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, the state interest in taking the condoms must 
be sufficiently compelling to justify the infringement of the fundamental 
right, and the means of infringement must be narrowly tailored to the stated 
goal. 
Part II.A of this Note discusses the line of Supreme Court decisions 
holding that the right to contraception is a fundamental privacy right.  These 
cases discuss when the state’s interest in denying contraception can 
outweigh the need to protect a fundamental right, resulting in the state 
action being declared constitutional.  Part II.B examines the state interests 
involved in taking condoms for evidence against suspected sex workers.  
This section analyzes the necessity of using condoms in the policing and 
prosecution of prostitution. 
 
prostitution-related offenses.  Many of the condoms taken had been given to street workers 
by the City Department of Health.”). 
 146. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 57. 
 147. Letter from Arlo Smith, S.F. Dist. Attorney, to Sandra Hernandez, Dir. of Pub. 
Health (Sept. 6, 1994), available at http://www.bayswan.org/CondomsAsEvidence
SFTFP.pdf. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See THE S.F. TASK FORCE ON PROSTITUTION, supra note 143, at 23. 
 150. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 60. 
 151. Id. 
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A.  Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Contraception 
The Supreme Court has routinely held that the Constitution limits states’ 
ability to interfere with individuals’ privacy rights in the vein of family and 
family planning, and the Court has similarly protected people’s right to 
bodily integrity.152  The Court first recognized the right to privacy in 
contraception in Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965, when it held 
unconstitutional a Connecticut statute forbidding the use of 
contraceptives.153  The Court found that forbidding contraceptive use for 
married couples intruded on the right to marital privacy and autonomy in 
decisions concerning reproductive choices.154  Over the next two decades, 
the Court extended this privacy right to use contraceptives to individuals,155 
and then shortly after concluded that restrictions on access to contraceptives 
are also unconstitutional.156  This section will discuss the Supreme Court’s 
five main decisions concerning contraception and family planning, 
examining the fundamental right to privacy that the Supreme Court 
addressed in Griswold and extended afterwards.157 
1.  Married Couples’ Protected Privacy Right in the Use 
of Contraceptive Devices 
In 1965, the Supreme Court first ruled on the right to possess 
contraceptives for the sole purpose of preventing pregnancy, finding that 
the state cannot interfere with that right without a compelling state 
interest.158  In Griswold, the Supreme Court looked at a Connecticut statute 
that forbid medical professionals from providing information about 
contraception or contraceptive devices to married couples for the purpose of 
preventing pregnancy.159  Connecticut state law did, however, permit the 
use of contraceptives to prevent the spread of disease.160  Griswold 
involved a married couple that consulted a doctor about the best way to 
 
 152. Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992); see also 
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (holding that intrusive surgery to retrieve a bullet from 
a robbery suspect’s chest was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment); Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding that state laws which forbid interracial marriages 
were unconstitutional and violated people’s right to make decisions about their family); 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding that forcing a suspect who swallowed 
drugs to ingest a substance to induce vomiting violated the defendant’s due process rights); 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that an Oklahoma state penal law 
that allowed people convicted of multiple felonies to be sterilized violated the equal 
protection clause and was unconstitutional). 
 153. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 154. Id. at 485–86. 
 155. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 156. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding that when regulations 
impose burdens on decisions as important as whether or not to bear a child, the state interest 
must be sufficiently compelling to warrant adherence to the rule in light of infringing on 
individuals privacy rights). 
 157. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 506. 
1072 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
avoid conception.161  The doctor was examining married patients and 
prescribing an appropriate birth control device or method, or giving general 
advice on how to prevent conception.162  The state fined the doctor 
according to a Connecticut statute that forbid the use of any drug or device 
that prevented conception, in conjunction with a statute that forbid assisting 
in the commitment of any crime.163  The doctor challenged the 
constitutionality of the statute, claiming that it violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment.164 
The Supreme Court held that forbidding the use of contraceptives by 
married couples was unconstitutional because it was an intrusion on the 
right to marital privacy.165  Justice William O. Douglas, writing for the 
Court, first looked to where the right to marital privacy originated, 
discussing the Bill of Rights and finding that those rights have penumbras, 
or extensions of privacy rights.166  He found the penumbras of privacy 
rights to exist as emanations from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
Amendment rights, describing these constitutional rights as creating zones 
of privacy within which the right to marital privacy falls.167  Justice 
Douglas noted that the Self-Incrimination Clause in the Fifth Amendment 
creates a zone of privacy, so a citizen does not have to surrender to the 
government to his detriment.168  He also emphasized that the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments protect against government intrusion into the home and 
the “privacies of life.”169  The Court looked to its recent decisions 
concerning Fourth Amendment law, recognizing that American citizens 
respected individual privacy rights.170  Those rights extend to married 
 
 161. Id. at 479. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id.  The first statute states:  “Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or 
instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars 
or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and 
imprisoned.”  The second statute states:  “Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, 
hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he 
were the principal offender.” Id. at 480 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 485–86. 
 166. Id. at 484; see also David Helscher, Griswold v. Connecticut and the Unenumerated 
Right of Privacy, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 33, 35 (1994). 
 167. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.  Justice Arthur J. Goldberg wrote a concurring opinion 
highlighting the Ninth Amendment as the source of the right to marital privacy. Id. at 487 
(Goldberg, J., concurring); see also Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., The Legacy of Griswold, 16 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 511, 523 (1989) (detailing how Justice Goldberg found that the Ninth 
Amendment protects unenumerated rights through the Due Process Clause).  Justice John 
Marshall Harlan found the right to marital privacy to be protected under the liberty of the 
Due Process Clause. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 168. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (majority opinion). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 484–85 (stating that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments provide “protection 
against all governmental invasions ‘of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of 
life’” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886))); see also Akhil Reed Amar, 
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 811 n.195 (1994) (discussing 
the Fourth Amendment as a source for privacy rights and emphasizing its use in Griswold). 
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couples making decisions about whether to conceive a child, because 
marriage is “a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by 
several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”171 
Having decided that married couples have a fundamental privacy right in 
their ability to choose whether to use contraception, the Court considered 
the statute at issue.172  Because the law completely forbid the use of 
contraceptives, instead of attempting to regulate the sale of contraceptives, 
the Court held the law to be overly broad.173  The Court stated that the 
“governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally 
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep 
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected 
freedoms.”174  Because the law attempted to forbid all married couples from 
using contraceptive methods and devices in violation of the expectation of 
privacy guaranteed to married couples, the Court found the law 
insufficiently narrowly tailored to pass the strict scrutiny standard, and 
therefore unconstitutional.175 
In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Arthur J. Goldberg 
discussed the state interest in forbidding married couples’ access to 
contraception.176  Listing the purpose of the statute as protecting marital 
fidelity, Justice Goldberg found that while this interest was compelling, the 
means taken to enforce the interest were not narrowly tailored.177  Because 
Connecticut had statutes forbidding adultery and fornication, the statute’s 
intrusion into marital privacy was unnecessary and therefore not precisely 
tailored to the stated goal.178  Thus, the broadly sweeping statute was 
unconstitutional, despite the state interest in protecting marital fidelity.179  
This case was the first to lay out the right to privacy in decisions about the 
use of contraceptives, and the Court continued to expand this right over the 
next decade.180 
 
 171. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
 172. Id.; see also Donald H.J. Hermann, Pulling the Fig Leaf Off the Right of Privacy:  
Sex and the Constitution, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 909, 924 (2005). 
 173. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
 174. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 337 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional 
Double Standards:  Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 288 (1973). 
 175. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86 (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred 
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?  The very idea is 
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 176. Id. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
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 178. Id.; see also Robert E. L. Richardson, A Police Officer’s Legal, Consensual, Off-
Duty Sexual Relationship Is Not Protected by the Right of Privacy Under Either the Federal 
or Texas Constitutions:  City of Sherman v. Henry, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 187, 204 (1997) 
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 179. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498–99. 
 180. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, § 10.3, at 835–38. 
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2.  The Privacy Rights Inherent in Contraceptives 
for Unmarried Individuals 
Seven years after establishing married couples’ right to access 
contraceptives, the Supreme Court considered the rights of unmarried 
individuals to obtain and use contraception in Eisenstadt v. Baird.181  In 
Eisenstadt, the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute that allowed only 
married couples to obtain contraceptive devices, claiming that it violated 
the rights of single people under the Equal Protection Clause.182  The Court 
found that privacy rights are inherent in the individual; thus, because 
married couples had a right to use contraceptive devices, individuals did as 
well.183  The Court held, “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as 
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”184  Because the right to 
access and use contraceptives was declared a fundamental right in 
Griswold,185 the state had to demonstrate a compelling state interest in 
forbidding unmarried individuals from obtaining contraception and that the 
statute was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.186 
The government argued that the purpose of the Massachusetts statute was 
to discourage premarital sex.187  The Court found that purpose to be 
inconsistent with the legislation and therefore invalid, stating that 
Massachusetts could not possibly intend for unwanted pregnancy to serve 
as a punishment for engaging in premarital sex.188  The ban on distribution 
of contraceptives was only “marginally” related to the state’s purpose and 
therefore could not be considered rationally related to an important 
government purpose as required under a strict scrutiny analysis.189  The 
government next argued that forbidding single people from accessing 
contraception was a necessary health measure.190  Declaring this argument 
invalid, the Court cited the fact that contraceptives are not dangerous, and 
that doctors are able to effectively supply them to married couples, 
therefore forbidding that same access to single persons was 
discriminatory.191  Moreover, because almost no health risks exist in taking 
 
 181. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 182. Id. at 441–43. 
 183. Id. 
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 189. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 448; see also Kathleen A. Ward, A Dose of Reality:  The 
Prescription for a Limited Constitutional Right to Privacy in Pharmaceutical Records Is 
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 190. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 451–52. 
 191. Id. at 451; see also Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition:  From Griswold to 
Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1544 (1994). 
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contraception, the law was overly broad and did not fulfill the government’s 
stated purpose.192  The Court found that prohibiting pharmacists from 
distributing condoms served no legitimate government purpose, even when 
the state construed the action as necessary as a health measure.193  In a 
footnote, Justice William J. Brennan noted that the government purpose 
was not even sufficient to overcome rational basis review under the Equal 
Protection analysis, let alone meet the heightened standard of strict scrutiny 
necessary for the fundamental right to make decisions about contraception 
established in Griswold.194 
3. The Fundamental Privacy Right To Make Decisions 
About Family Planning 
In Carey v. Population Services International195 the Supreme Court 
examined a New York State law that prohibited the selling or distribution of 
contraceptives to anyone under the age of sixteen.196  The law also forbid 
the distribution of contraceptives to persons over the age of fifteen by 
anyone but a licensed pharmacist.197  Finally, the law prohibited the 
advertisement or display of any contraceptive device.198  After reviewing 
the cases which established autonomy in choices of procreation as a 
fundamental right—and drawing on the language used in Eisenstadt199—the 
Supreme Court held that “where a decision as fundamental as that whether 
to bear or beget a child is involved, regulations imposing a burden on it may 
be justified only by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn 
to express only those interests.”200  The Court found that limiting the 
distribution of nonprescription contraceptives to only licensed pharmacists 
placed a heavy burden on individuals who wished to purchase and use 
contraception.201  Even though the burden was not as great as would be 
imposed by a total ban on contraception, it was significant enough to limit 
access to contraception and stifle price competition, and, therefore, the law 
was an overly broad intrusion on a fundamental privacy right that could not 
survive the strict scrutiny test.202 
In Carey, the Court considered the state interest in depth, concluding that 
none of the justifications offered by the state were sufficiently compelling 
to permit interference with a fundamental right.203  The appellants argued 
that limiting the sale of contraceptives to only pharmacists helped keep 
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young people from selling contraceptives, worked to protect contraceptive 
devices from being tampered with, and facilitated the enforcement of other 
parts of the statute concerning contraceptives.204  None of these arguments 
were sufficient for the Court to find a compelling state interest.205 
In analyzing the state’s first argument, the Court found that the statute 
forbidding the sale of contraceptives by anyone other than a pharmacist was 
not substantially related to the stated goal of preventing young people from 
selling contraceptives.206  The Court also found that pharmacists are not 
better able to prevent tampering with contraceptives than any other person, 
and, therefore, the stated goal of the statute was not a sufficiently 
compelling state interest to justify an intrusion into a fundamental right.207  
Finally, the Court pointed out that a state’s desire to avoid enacting more 
administrative regulations, such as to prevent tampering with contraception, 
had never been found to be a sufficiently compelling reason to interfere 
with a constitutional right.208  The lack of a compelling state interest left the 
Court no choice but to strike down the statute.209 
In analyzing the statute, which prohibited the sale of contraceptives to 
anyone under the age of fifteen, the Court again found that the state interest 
was not sufficiently compelling to justify the interference with the 
fundamental right to contraception.210  The appellants argued that the 
statute was constitutional as an effort in furtherance of New York State 
policies prohibiting minors from engaging in promiscuous sex.211  The 
Court first noted that despite the ability of states to make laws for minors 
that were more restrictive than those for adults, outright prohibitions on 
minors’ ability to obtain abortions and mandatory parental consent 
requirements had recently been found to be unconstitutional.212  While the 
Court was willing to give credence to the argument that preventing teenage 
promiscuity was important, it was not a sufficiently compelling state 
interest to justify the burden on access to contraceptives imposed by the 
statute.213  Because excluding minors from accessing contraceptives was 
not in any way linked to decreasing teenage promiscuity, the Court found 
that the law was not related to a sufficiently compelling government 
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purpose.214  Despite the appellant’s argument that the statute still permitted 
physicians to sell contraceptives to minors, the Court found the burden on 
the fundamental right to be too great to survive strict scrutiny.215  By 
applying the strict scrutiny standard, the Court affirmed its previous 
decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt, recognizing that choices about 
contraceptive use and family planning were fundamental privacy rights.216 
4.  Constitutionally Protected Privacy Rights Extended to Abortion 
In Roe v. Wade,217 the Supreme Court extended the privacy rights 
identified in Griswold and Eisenstadt to include a woman’s right to obtain 
an abortion.218  Roe was a challenge to a Texas statute that prohibited the 
termination of a pregnancy except in cases of risk to the mother’s life.219  
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for the Court, proceeded through an in-
depth discussion of the history of abortion and the right to privacy, 
ultimately concluding that the right to obtain an abortion was a fundamental 
right.220  He spent a considerable period of time discussing the right to 
reproductive autonomy.221  The Court concluded that the right to privacy, 
“whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal 
liberty and restrictions upon state action . . . [or] in the Ninth Amendment’s 
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a 
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”222  The 
Court held that the Texas statute criminalized abortion too broadly by 
outlawing abortion except in the case of a life-saving procedure for the 
mother.223  While the Court recognized two important state interests—the 
protection of maternal health and the interest in the life of the fetus—neither 
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of these interests were sufficiently compelling to outlaw abortion at all 
stages of pregnancy.224 
The state argued that the ability to recognize and protect the fetus was a 
compelling state interest that justified infringement on the right to privacy 
in procreation.225  The Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not 
include unborn fetuses in the definition of “person,” so the state could not 
argue that the right to protect the life of the fetus was sufficient to ban 
abortion at all stages of pregnancy.226  In deciding when the life of the fetus 
was sufficiently compelling to justify a ban on abortion, the Court found 
that during the first trimester, the state has no compelling interest in the life 
of the fetus because it would not be viable outside of the woman,227 and 
forcing a woman to carry a child to term greatly burdens the mother.228  
However, the state interest changes as the fetus develops and becomes 
viable.229  The state interest becomes compelling only at viability, or once 
the fetus could survive outside the mother.230  It is at this point that the state 
may proscribe abortion in the interest of protecting life, because the state 
interest in the life of the fetus is sufficiently compelling to be balanced 
against the privacy rights of the mother.231 
In considering the state interest in maternal health, the Court found that 
the state does have an interest in regulating abortion procedures for the 
protection of the health of the mother.232  This interest only becomes 
compelling after the first trimester, where the risks associated with 
obtaining an abortion are higher than with continuing to carry the fetus.233  
Even after finding the state interest in maternal health to be compelling after 
the first trimester, the Court still limited the type of regulations states could 
impose on abortion to those substantially related to the goal of protecting 
the mother.234 
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5.  The Most Recent Iteration of the Right To Have an Abortion 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,235 the 
Supreme Court affirmed their previous decision in Roe that abortion was a 
protected fundamental privacy right; however, they reconsidered the state 
interests in fetal viability and the test for analyzing a state’s interest.236  The 
Court held that strict scrutiny was too stringent a standard of review for 
regulations concerning abortion, and that the state interest must be analyzed 
under an undue burden framework.237  The Court found that it is “[o]nly 
where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to 
make this decision [that] the power of the State reach[es] into the heart of 
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”238  The Court concluded 
that state regulations may encourage women to carry a fetus to term, as the 
state has some interest in the life of the fetus, without infringing on the 
woman’s privacy interest in making decisions about contraception.239  The 
Court noted, however, that any such regulation must only be in place to 
help inform a woman’s choice in deciding whether to carry the baby to 
term, and could not be used to hinder that free choice.240  The Court would 
consider any substantial interference with the right to obtain an abortion 
unconstitutional if it is not backed by a compelling state interest sufficient 
to meet strict scrutiny.241 
In analyzing the Pennsylvania law under the undue burden standard, the 
Court upheld a twenty-four-hour waiting period before obtaining an 
abortion, the requirement that women be informed of the detailed 
information available about the fetus, and extensive reporting and record 
keeping requirements for doctors.242  The Court struck down the spousal 
notification provision as unconstitutional, arguing that it would prevent a 
significant number of women from obtaining an abortion, and therefore 
posed an undue burden on the woman’s right of free choice.243  While the 
undue burden standard is not as rigorous as strict scrutiny, the Court 
affirmed the privacy interests inherent in the right to make decisions about 
contraception and family planning.244  Moreover, when deciding to place 
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more limits on abortion, the Court did so because of the state interest in 
preserving fetal life.245 
B.  Police Officers in New York City, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C. 
Confiscate Condoms from Suspected Sex Workers To 
Enforce Antiprostitution Laws 
This section lays out the police practice of confiscating condoms from 
suspected sex workers in three locations under three different sets of state 
laws.  The section then discusses the state interest behind the practice of 
taking condoms as necessary for the enforcement of antiprostitution laws. 
1.  New York City Police Practice and Rationale 
As described in Part I, police officers in New York City take condoms 
from sex workers, sometimes for the purpose of use as evidence, sometimes 
simply to throw the condoms away.246  As state actors entrusted with the 
safety of the public, police officers in New York City have an interest in 
preventing prostitution in accordance with the New York Penal Code, 
which prohibits prostitution, promoting prostitution, patronizing 
prostitution, and loitering for purposes of prostitution.247  In accordance 
with the stop-and-frisk doctrine discussed above, police officers may stop 
persons suspected of prostitution if there is reasonable suspicion that they 
are engaged in one of the above-listed acts.248  It is during these encounters 
for the purpose of policing prostitution that officers confiscate condoms 
from suspected sex workers.249  After an arrest occurs, the New York Police 
Department Patrol Guide lists factors which officers should list on arrest 
reports when processing an arrest for prostitution.250  Those factors include:  
the length of time the officer observed a suspect, the action that caused the 
arrest, the location of the officer when the arrest occurred, the attire of the 
suspect, and any other necessary information.251  When making an arrest 
for loitering for prostitution, the factors also include the conduct and 
clothing of the arrestee and whether or not the person is a known 
prostitute.252  The Patrol Guide also states that when an officer is making an 
arrest for prostitution based on an overheard conversation, the officer 
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should add loitering for prostitution to the charges against the suspect.253  
New York City’s Prostitution Complaint Forms provide space for police 
officers to write down how many condoms they found on a person 
suspected of engaging in prostitution or prostitution-related offenses.254  
The borough of Brooklyn’s Prostitution Complaint Form contains a specific 
line that reads “(fill in number) _______ condoms” under a section where 
police officer can include additional information that indicates a suspect 
was engaged in or attempting to engage in prostitution.255 
The Office of the District Attorney for the borough of Queens, New York 
stated that condoms “are useful items of evidence in prostitution-related 
offenses, and banning condoms as evidence ‘would seriously damage . . . 
cases.’”256  The office pointed to the fact that condoms frequently serve as 
evidence in situations where prostitutes are victims of exploitation, such as 
in sex trafficking cases, or attempts to close brothels.257  In regard to these 
cases, the office estimated that of seven sex trafficking cases and sixty-five 
cases for prostitution-related offenses, condoms were expected to be part of 
the prosecution’s evidence in two of the cases.258  A report by the Columbia 
Law School Sexuality and Gender Law Clinic found that condoms were 
used as evidence in thirty-nine cases.259  In discussing why condoms should 
be confiscated to serve as evidence, the Queens District Attorney’s office 
also pointed to the fact that pimps frequently facilitate prostitution by 
providing condoms, so collecting them as evidence can be useful in 
prosecuting pimps as well.260 
In cases concerning prostitution, the prosecutor must prove that a person 
is engaging in or attempting to engage in a sexual act for a fee.261  For 
example, in People v. Benjamin,262 a woman was charged with engaging in 
prostitution after exchanging emails with an undercover police officer, 
during which she specified the time and place they should meet for her to 
provide a massage for the cost of $200.263  When the officer met the 
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defendant and asked if she would perform sexual services for him during 
the massage, she stated that the $200 fee included sexual services.264  It was 
this exchange of a fee for sexual acts that resulted in the defendant’s charge 
for engaging in prostitution.265 
While police officers take condoms as evidence, one judge has refused to 
accept them as evidence of prostitution in court.  Because most cases 
involving charges for prostitution are handled outside of court, it is very 
rare for a prostitution case to make it to the courthouse.266  In a rare case 
that made it to court over a prostitution charge, Judge Richard M. Weinberg 
of the Criminal Court of the City of New York refused to allow the 
prosecutor to enter the condoms as evidence.267  Judge Weinberg stated, “I 
don’t care about the condoms.  This is the 21st Century.”268  After the 
prosecutor voiced his objection and argued that the condoms were 
“circumstantial evidence of defendant’s intent,” the judge declared that it 
was also the intent of “every other woman and man who wants to protect 
themselves in the age of AIDS.”269  The judge ruled that the condoms were 
not probative of any crime, and therefore refused to admit them as 
evidence.270 
2.  Confiscation of Condoms As Carried Out by 
Police Officers in Los Angeles 
The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) confiscates condoms as 
evidence of prostitution in line with their enforcement of antiprostitution 
laws.271  According to the LAPD’s documentation of arrests, prostitution 
offenses most often result in a complaint being sought.  In 2010, 4,775 
adults were arrested on prostitution related offenses; misdemeanor 
complaints were entered against 4,716 of those people.272  In 2011, 3,833 
adults were arrested for prostitution-related offenses, and complaints were 
sought in all 3,833 arrests.273  The LAPD stated that it “maintain[s] a strong 
enforcement campaign against prostitution, largely in response to citizen 
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complaints about the activity occurring in their neighborhoods.”274  The 
LAPD lieutenant in charge of the Special Enforcement Division stated that 
condoms are useful evidence in proving that a person is loitering for 
prostitution or is engaging in an act in furtherance of prostitution.275  While 
the officer expressed concern that sex workers might not use condoms for 
fear of arrest, and denied a policy that two or three condoms was enough for 
an officer to initiate an arrest, he “defended condoms as targets of stops and 
searches of persons suspected of prostitution, stating that ‘the average 
citizen isn’t walking around with condoms in their pocket.’”276 
When speaking with Human Rights Watch, the Office of the City 
Attorney of Los Angeles said that condoms are “routinely catalogued” as 
evidence and are introduced at trial to support prostitution charges; 
however, they are not a focal point of filing charges against suspected sex 
workers.277  The deputy chief of the Safe Neighborhoods and Gang 
Division stated that condoms are “particularly probative evidence where 
there [are] a large number of condoms in someone’s possession or at a 
business site such as a massage parlor.”278  The deputy chief emphasized 
that Los Angeles did not wish to discourage condom use, and that there had 
been no evidence that this was occurring among sex workers.279  The 
deputy chief also pointed out that it was very “rare” to arrest a person for 
prostitution and not find condoms on his or her person, which highlights the 
state interest involved in the practice of using condoms as evidence of 
prostitution.280 
3.  The Police Practice of Taking Condoms As Evidence 
of Prostitution in Washington, D.C. 
Police officers in Washington D.C. are similarly tasked with enforcing 
the prohibition of prostitution.281  Assistant Chief of Police Peter Newsham 
explained that “prostitution cases are not a high priority” and that most 
arrests for prostitution in the D.C. area arise out of complaints from 
members of the public.282  Officials in Washington, D.C., while expressing 
concern for the fact that condoms-as-evidence policies might discourage 
condom use among sex workers, stated that condoms can be used as 
supplementary evidence of prostitution when collected incident to an 
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arrest.283  Assistant Chief Newsham spoke to the importance of collecting 
condoms as evidence to prosecute human trafficking cases.284  He “asserted 
that condoms may be helpful as supplementary evidence in [human 
trafficking] cases and will continue to be collected at the scene.”285  
However, Assistant Chief Newsham was concerned that police officers 
were “editorializing” about the number of condoms a person could legally 
carry, particularly in a way that made suspected sex workers feel threatened 
that simply possessing condoms could lead to arrest.286  He emphasized the 
fact that searches of suspected sex workers could only be made if probable 
cause for arrest exists at the time of the search.287 
In 2011, the Metropolitan Police Department reported 940 arrests of 
adults for prostitution or commercialized vice.288  This number was lower 
than the reported arrests in 2010 for prostitution, which amounted to 1,409 
arrests of adults.289  In 2012, the number of adult arrests for prostitution 
was even lower, coming in at 619.290 
While police officers take condoms from suspected sex workers for 
evidentiary purposes, these condoms are not always admitted in trials.291  
Judge Linda Kay Davis, who heads the special prostitution docket in 
Washington, D.C., said that she has never seen condoms actually entered 
into evidence in individual prostitution cases in the two years she has been 
presiding over the docket.292 
III.  THE STATE INTEREST IN POLICING PROSTITUTION IS NOT 
SUFFICIENTLY COMPELLING TO JUSTIFY THE INFRINGEMENT OF THE 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO ACCESS CONTRACEPTIVES 
As discussed above, once the Supreme Court identifies a fundamental 
right, laws cannot interfere with that constitutional right unless they are 
sufficiently compelling and narrowly tailored to the state’s interest.  This 
Part argues that there is a fundamental right to contraception, and that the 
police do not have a sufficiently compelling state interest in policing 
prostitution to justify the confiscation of condoms from suspected sex 
workers.  Part III.A discusses the fundamental right for sex workers to use 
and access condoms.  Part III.B argues that police officers confiscation of 
condoms from sex workers violates that fundamental right.  Part III.C 
argues that the state interest in policing prostitution is not sufficiently 
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compelling to allow the police to infringe on that fundamental right.  
Finally, Part III.D argues that the confiscation of condoms for use as 
evidence is not the least restrictive or least discriminatory alternative 
available to police officers.  Because the state interest is not sufficiently 
compelling and the state action is not narrowly tailored, taking condoms to 
use as evidence against sex workers is unconstitutional.293 
A.  There Is a Fundamental Right To Access and Use Contraceptives 
The cases of Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey establish a fundamental 
right to contraceptive use free from overly burdensome state interference.294  
In Griswold, the Supreme Court recognized a fundamental right to marital 
privacy in decisions about whether to use contraceptives.295  The Court 
extended this right in Eisenstadt, finding that unmarried individuals have a 
privacy right to access and use contraception.296  In Carey, the Court once 
again protected the access and use of contraception as a fundamental right, 
finding that states cannot limit a minor’s access to contraceptives.297  Going 
even further to protect the fundamental right to contraception, in Roe and 
Casey the Supreme Court upheld a woman’s right to choose to terminate 
her pregnancy through abortion.298  These Supreme Court cases establish a 
fundamental right to access and use contraception.  Sex workers carry 
condoms to use as protection against HIV/AIDS, other sexually transmitted 
diseases, and unwanted pregnancy.299  Sex workers have a fundamental 
right to access and use condoms and that right cannot be infringed upon 
unless a compelling state interest is at stake and the method of enforcement 
of that interest is narrowly tailored.300 
B.  Police Policies Constitute an Infringement on the Fundamental 
Right To Access and Use Contraceptives 
Taking condoms from suspected sex workers deprives them of the ability 
to access and use contraceptives.301  Because the Supreme Court has 
established a fundamental right to use contraceptives, law enforcement 
confiscation of condoms as evidence constitutes an infringement on that 
right and must satisfy strict scrutiny.302  In Griswold, the Supreme Court 
struck down a state statute that allowed contraceptive use for the purpose of 
preventing disease but not for preventing pregnancy.303  When simply 
limiting access to condoms constitutes a substantial interference with a 
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fundamental right, as the Supreme Court held in Carey, taking condoms 
from sex workers and depriving them of access to contraceptives constitutes 
an even greater infringement on the fundamental right.304  Taking condoms 
from suspected sex workers is only constitutional if it is narrowly tailored 
and done for a sufficiently compelling state purpose.305 
C.  State Actors Do Not Have a Sufficiently Compelling State Interest To 
Justify the Infringement on the Fundamental Right to Contraceptives 
The police practice of taking condoms to use as evidence in New York 
City, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C. is not conducted for a sufficiently 
compelling state interest to justify the interference with the fundamental 
right to make family planning decisions and use contraceptives.306  Police 
officers confiscate condoms for the purpose of using them as evidence in 
the prosecution of suspected sex workers.307  Prosecutors, however, are not 
using the condoms as evidence.308  In some cases, police officers are simply 
taking the condoms to throw in the trash.309  A compelling state interest 
must be the actual purpose behind a state action, and the Supreme Court has 
never stated what exactly constitutes a compelling state interest.310 
The Court has identified a compelling state interest in the protection of 
the country during wartime,311 in ensuring the safety of children,312 in the 
protection of the health of a pregnant woman, and in the life of a fetus once 
it has reached viability.313  Invading a fundamental right simply to aid in the 
prosecution of criminal laws is not a sufficiently compelling interest when 
measured against interests the Court has previously found compelling.314  
The protection of life and country are much more compelling governmental 
goals than enforcing nonviolent criminal laws in a way that infringes on a 
fundamental right.315  Moreover, all three cities are currently questioning 
the practice of taking condoms as evidence, thereby demonstrating that 
there is not a compelling reason to continue the action.316  Because the state 
interest is not compelling, taking condoms from suspected sex workers is an 
unconstitutional infringement of a fundamental right.317 
In New York, the state interest in fighting HIV/AIDS has led the 
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to give out free condoms 
throughout New York City, where there is a heightened occurrence of 
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HIV/AIDS.318  Taking condoms from people who are engaged in sex work 
is directly in opposition to the state’s interest in protecting health.319  While 
police officers have a state interest in upholding antiprostitution laws, the 
small number of cases that actually make it to court where the condoms 
could be used as evidence is too low to justify the infringement on the 
fundamental right.320 
The Queens District Attorney estimated that of seventy-two cases for 
prostitution-related offenses, condoms were expected to be part of the 
prosecution’s evidence in a mere 2.77 percent of the cases.321  Moreover, a 
state court judge’s refusal to accept condoms as evidence further indicates a 
divide between the constitutional right to be free from state interference 
with a fundamental right and the legitimate government purpose.322  If the 
courts are unwilling to admit the evidence, then the confiscated condoms no 
longer serve the government purpose of enforcing antiprostitution laws.323 
The Supreme Court has found a state interference with a fundamental 
right to be valid during times of war or when necessary for the protection of 
children.324  The interest in carrying out ordinary criminal law enforcement 
will not justify the infringement of the fundamental right to contraception, 
particularly when the evidence so rarely makes it to court. 
In Washington, D.C. and Los Angeles, outreach workers experience 
harassment at the hands of police officers for distributing condoms to sex 
workers.325  The Supreme Court established a right to advertise for and 
distribute condoms when it stated in Carey that limiting the access to 
distribution of contraceptives was sufficient to constitute an 
unconstitutional violation of a fundamental privacy right.326  Police officers 
cannot argue that they are confiscating condoms from outreach workers to 
use in the enforcement of antiprostitution laws.327  Because there is no 
compelling state interest in prohibiting outreach workers from distributing 
condoms, police officers’ infringement on the right to contraception is 
unconstitutional.328 
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D.  The Government Action Is Not Narrowly Tailored to the Goal of 
Policing and Prosecuting Prostitution 
Not only is the state interest in enforcing criminal laws not sufficiently 
compelling to justify an infringement of a fundamental right, the police 
practice is not narrowly tailored to the purpose of policing prostitution.  
Any infringement on a fundamental right must be narrowly tailored, and 
“the fit between the government’s action and its asserted purposed [must] 
be ‘as perfect as practicable.’”329  The police practices in New York City, 
Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C. are not narrowly tailored to the goal of 
policing prostitution because police officers do not need to deprive sex 
workers of access to condoms to enforce antiprostitution laws.330  Sex 
workers may still engage in sex work even if their condoms have been 
confiscated, demonstrating that taking condoms does not stop prostitution 
from occurring.331  Moreover, it is not necessary for police officers to take 
the condoms if the goal is to use them as evidence against suspected sex 
workers.332 
The policy changes enacted by the city of San Francisco demonstrate that 
confiscation of condoms is not necessary to use those condoms as 
evidence.333  The city of San Francisco previously had a policy that allowed 
police officers to confiscate condoms from suspected sex workers.334  The 
district attorney permanently banned the use of condoms as evidence of 
prostitution in 1994.335  Currently, San Francisco law prohibits police 
officers from taking condoms, and only allows them to photograph the 
condoms found on persons suspected of engaging in prostitution.336  While 
this policy still causes fear of interactions with police officers and 
discourages sex workers from carrying condoms, it demonstrates that states 
do not need to confiscate the condoms to use them as potential evidence.337 
This type of police action is also not narrowly tailored because condoms 
are not probative of whether sex is being exchanged for a fee.338  In all 
three cities with condoms-as-evidence policies, the act that needs to be 
proven to prosecute someone for prostitution is engaging in sex acts in 
exchange for a fee.339  Condoms cannot prove that someone is exchanging 
sex acts for a fee.340  They merely prove that someone is protecting 
themselves from sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancy 
while engaging in sex.341  Because police infringement on the right to 
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contraception is not narrowly tailored, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny 
standard necessary for an infringement on a fundamental right to be deemed 
constitutional.342 
CONCLUSION 
Sex workers throughout the United States use condoms to protect 
themselves from sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancy.  
Police officers confiscate these condoms for the purpose of using them as 
evidence in the prosecution of prostitution.  The Supreme Court has 
recognized fundamental rights that states cannot infringe upon unless a law 
or policy is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.  The 
right to access and use contraception is one of those fundamental rights. 
Because the Supreme Court has identified a right for all individuals to be 
free from state interference in their choice of whether to use contraceptive 
devices, state actors confiscating condoms from suspected sex workers 
infringes on that constitutionally protected privacy right.  The government’s 
lack of a compelling state interest in taking condoms, coupled with the 
failure to narrowly tailor the policy so as to involve the least restrictive 
infringement of the right, means that the conduct cannot survive strict 
scrutiny.  For this reason, New York City, Washington, D.C., and Los 
Angeles are enforcing unconstitutional policies and must stop confiscating 
condoms from suspected sex workers. 
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